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 1 Introduction
￿Financial integration is of key importance for the conduct of the single monetary pol-
icy, as a well-integrated ￿nancial system enhances the smooth and e⁄ective transmission
of monetary policy impulse through the euro area. The degree of integration is found to
vary considerably across the di⁄erent market segments, depending also on the degree of
integration of the respective market infrastructure.￿ECB(2008)
Financial market integration is one of the most crucial issues for the European Central
Bank (ECB) as emphasized in ECB (2008). This is because the ECB has only one policy
rate for the euro area economy. If the ￿nancial integration is imperfect, an action of the
ECB has di⁄erent e⁄ects on the euro area countries, which makes the monetary policy
very complicated. Therefore, many studies investigate whether the euro ￿nancial market
is perfectly integrated or not (Mojon, 2000; Adam et al., 2002; Słrensen and Werner, 2006;
ECB, 2006; ECB, 2008; Gropp and Kashyap, 2009; van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008). They
conclude that after the establishment of the ECB, ￿nancial markets have become more
integrated across countries, but the loan market integration is substantially incomplete.1
One of the important properties in the loan market is a sticky adjustment of the loan
rate to the policy rate as shown by many papers such as Slovin and Sushka (1983) and
Berger and Udell (1992) for the US economy, Słrensen and Werner (2006) and Gambacorta
(2008) for the euro area economy, and BOJ (2007) for the Japanese economy.2 This point
has direct implications for evaluating imperfect loan markets integration in terms of the
stickiness of loan rates across countries. If banking integration is complete, the adjustment
1For example, Adam et al. (2002) and ECB (2008) report that integration in the bond and stock markets
are well advanced in the euro area. They conclude, however, that corporate loan market integration is
extremely limited. They point out that a reason for incomplete integration is a di⁄erent legal system of
each country for a ￿nancial market.
2Slovin and Sushka (1983) and Berger and Udell (1992) point out that the private banks need two or
perhaps more quarters to adjust loan rates using micro level data in the US. Słrensen and Werner (2006)
shows incomplete pass-through from the policy rate to the loan rates using error correction models for macro
level data for the euro area economies. Moreover, they show that the degree of incomplete pass-through
di⁄ers across the countries. Gambacorta (2008) shows sticky adjustment of the loan rate for Germany. BOJ
(2007) and BOJ (2008) report that the major city (local) banks need ￿ve (seven) quarters to adjust loan
rates.
1speeds of loan rates should be the same in all countries because all loan rates uniformly
respond to the policy rate. As studies similar to this paper, Mojon (2000), Słrensen and
Werner (2007), and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) empirically ￿nd huge heterogeneity in
loan rate adjustments for euro area countries using econometric models. However, they
can only reveal the situation of the banking sector integration across euro area countries
on average because they assume time-invariant parameters for regressions.
In this paper, we estimate structural loan rate curves using a time-varying regression
with stochastic volatility (TVR-SV) for 12 euro area countries. Such a time-varying re-
gression model has recently become popular in empirical macroeconomics (e.g., Primiceri,
2005). This nonlinear structure with a drifting coe¢ cient can show a progress for loan
market integration in the euro area in real time.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. The loan rates are sticky to the policy rate in all euro
area countries for all loan maturities. However, the stickinesses di⁄ers across the countries.
Moreover, the degree of heterogeneity in loan rate stickiness is more prominent for longer
maturity loans. We cannot ￿nd evidence of complete convergence in loan rate stickiness,
which implies that banking sector integration is incomplete even 10 years after the euro area
was established. However, we ￿nd that loan rate stickiness is stable and slowly decrease
across countries during the sample period for short-term loans. For intermediate- and
long-term loans, we ￿nd that loan rate stickiness oscillates widely and converges to average
levels rather than converges to a smaller level. These are signs of a movement toward
perfect banking integration. Our estimations are fairly robust for di⁄erent speci￿cations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the structural model. Section 3
reports the estimation results. We check the estimation robustness in Section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Structural model
In contrast with previous studies that estimate econometric models, we aim to estimate
structural parameters of the loan rate curve to evaluate loan rate stickiness.
Teranishi (2008) develops a structural model of a loan rate curve with micro-foundations.
2In the model, private banks receive deposits at a policy rate, i.e., the call rate, from con-
sumers and lend these deposits to ￿rms at loan rates with markups over the policy rate.
Firms ￿nance the costs of productions using loans. The bank loan market is monopo-
listically competitive, so the loan rates o⁄ered by private banks can di⁄er according to
borrowers. Moreover, the loan rate contract is set under the Calvo (1983) adjustment
scheme. Thus, this structural model includes a stickiness in the loan rate to the pol-
icy rate, which is consistent with the former empirical studies (Slovin and Sushka, 1983;
Berger and Udell, 1992; Słrensen and Werner, 2006; Gambacorta, 2008; BOJ, 2007). The
loan rate curve is given as:
Rt = ￿1EtRt+1 + ￿2Rt￿1 + ￿3it: (1)
Rt is the loan rate at time t, Et is the expectation operator, and it is the policy rate. ￿1,




1+’2￿, and ￿3 ￿
(1￿’￿)(1￿’)
1+’2￿ ,
where ’ is the Calvo parameter determining the probability that a private bank does not
reset a loan rate and ￿ is a discount factor. All variables are log-linearized around the
steady state. For example, when the Calvo parameter ’ is 0.4, the probability of changing
the loan rate is 60 percent in each period. As the probability of resetting the loan rate,
1 ￿ ’, decreases, the inertia in the loan rate dynamics, i.e., ￿2, increases.
Note that the ￿rms ￿nance all costs of productions by loans in this basic setting. We
relax this assumption in the robustness check.
3 Estimation
3.1 Data
We use monthly interest rate data of the MFI Interest Rate Statistics, which is released by
the ECB.3 The sample period is from January 2003 to May 2008. We use the outstanding
(stock) loans, up to one year (short-term), over one year and up to ￿ve years (intermediate-
term), and over ￿ve years (long-term), from banks to non￿nancial corporations. Table
1 reports the summary statistics of the data. The standard deviation is an average of
3See http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/.
3standard deviations across 12 countries in each year and the range is the average of absolute
di⁄erences between the minimum and maximum values across 12 countries in each year.
Table 1 shows that there are level di⁄erences in the loan rates for all maturities, which is
also reported in ECB (2006). Although the standard deviations and ranges across countries
for intermediate-term loans slightly decrease, those for short- and long-term loans do not
decrease overall. Even in 2007, the range of the loan rate level across countries is still
more than two percent for short and intermediate-term loans and about 1.6 percent for
long-term loans.
There seems to be some heterogeneity among the loan markets in euro area countries.
As pointed out by previous studies, these loan rate di⁄erences come from di⁄erent degrees
of loan rate stickiness (Mojon, 2000; Słrensen and Werner, 2007; van Leuvensteijn et al.,
2008) and di⁄erent markups from the policy rate to the loan rates (Gropp and Kashyap,
2009; van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008) across the countries. In this paper, we focus our analysis
on the e⁄ect of loan rate stickiness on the loan rate dynamics. Thus, in estimations, we
use series that are log-detrended by the HP ￿lter with regular monthly criteria (14,400)
to eliminate the e⁄ect of the markup on loan rate dynamics. This is consistent with our
model that does not include the markup factor because the model is log-linearized around
the steady state as shown in equation (1).
3.2 Methodology
We estimate the structural loan curve de￿ned by equation (1) using the TVR-SV model.
The estimated equations are formulated by:
(Regression)
￿Rt = ￿￿Rt+1 + ~ ￿t(it ￿ Rt) + "t; "t ￿ N(0; v2
t); t = 1;:::;n:
(Time-varying coe¢ cient)
~ ￿t+1 = ~ ￿t + ut; ut ￿ N(0; ￿2
u); t = 1;:::;n ￿ 1;
~ ￿t > 0; t = 1;:::;n:
4(Stochastic volatility) ht = logv2
t,
ht+1 = ht + ￿t; ￿t ￿ N(0; ￿2
￿); t = 1;:::;n ￿ 1;
where ~ ￿t ￿
(1￿’t)(1￿’t￿)
1+’2
t￿ is a time-varying coe¢ cient, ’t is a time-varying version of the
Calvo parameter de￿ned in the theoretical model, and ht is stochastic volatility. We model
the time-varying coe¢ cient, where the stochastic volatility follows a random walk process to
allow permanent shifts. The drifting coe¢ cient is meant to capture a possible nonlinearity,
such as a gradual change or a structural break (Primiceri, 2005). The stochastic volatility
identi￿es a volatility clustering of shocks over the sample period. The TVR-SV model
forms a nonlinear Gaussian state space model. We take a Bayesian approach using the
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Chib and Greenberg, 1996) for a precise
and e¢ cient estimation of the TVR-SV model. We show a summary of the estimation
algorithm in the appendix.
Note that for our purpose of assessing the time-varying structure of the loan rate
curve, it is reasonable to assume the coe¢ cient is restricted to vary over only the positive
domain thanks to the restriction in the theoretical model.4 Moreover, we have a nonlinear
relation between the parameter ~ ￿t in the regression and the Calvo parameter in ~ ￿t. It may
be di¢ cult to estimate ’t using a classical method, although the posterior distribution
of ’t can be easily obtained in the context of Bayesian inference. In our analysis, the
following prior distributions are assumed: ￿￿2
u ￿ Gamma(5; 10￿3), ￿￿2
￿ ￿ Gamma(2; 0:1),
~ ￿1 ￿ N(0; 10), and h1 ￿ N(0; 10). These priors are rather di⁄use except the one for ￿u.5
We draw 10,000 samples after the initial 1,000 samples are discarded. We conclude that
4This restriction can be easily incorporated into the estimation procedure by rejecting the drawn sample
that does not satisfy the restriction throughout the MCMC iterations. In our experiments, the rejection
probability is not so high, which implies that the restriction may not make the estimation procedure
ine¢ cient.
5We use a model with a time-varying coe¢ cient and volatility. The identi￿cation problem may arise in
such a fully ￿ exible model. However, with the advantage of Bayesian inference, the proper prior for the
variance of the sequence of time-varying parameters can produce the identi￿ed posterior distribution. Thus,
we set a slightly tighter prior for ￿u. We check the prior sensitivity and the case of constant volatility for the
disturbance term in the regression. Through these additional estimations, we con￿rm that the estimation
results are robust with respect to both the di⁄erent prior and volatility speci￿cations.
5this iteration size is enough to estimate the posterior distribution of the TVR-SV model
with our data set (The appendix shows the diagnostics and ￿gures for the convergence
check). The discount factor is set as ￿ = 0:991=3. The forward variable Rt+1 is made
by ￿tting an AR(2) model.6 After we ￿t an AR(2) model to the entire sample for each
loan rate series and obtain the OLS estimate, we make one-month-ahead forecasts using
the OLS estimate as the forward variable, which provides in-sample forecasts. Note that
it might be more reasonable to use out-of-sample forecasts in the sense that the forecasts
should be considered using only the information that is available up to each time period.
We estimate the model using out-of-sample forecasts as a robustness check in Section 4.1.7
The computational results are generated using Ox version 4.02 (Doornik, 2006).
4 Estimation results
4.1 Stickiness
Figure 1 shows the estimation outcome for short-term loans for 12 countries.8 The posterior
means and one-standard-deviation bands are drawn for each period based on the sample
from the MCMC estimation as shown in Primiceri (2005). We report quarter base Calvo
parameters in the ￿gure. Note that the posterior distribution itself is estimated using
Bayesian estimation, not as the classical method. Thus, the deviation bands indicate the
parameter￿ s distribution rather than estimation errors.
The Calvo parameters are su¢ ciently above zeros in all countries, which implies that
the loan rate adjustments are sticky to the policy rate in all euro area countries.9 This
6Thus, we assume adaptive expectations to form the forward variable. Preston (2005), Branch and Evans
(2006), and Milani (2007) imply that adaptive expectations (learning) rather than rational expectations
can capture enough of the dynamics in the real economy.
7Alternatively, an AR model with a time-varying coe¢ cient could be considered to generate the forward
variable. However, using a time-varying coe¢ cient for the autoregressive parameter in a single equation
may cause an over-￿t of the data. For this reason, we use an out-of-sample robustness check with recursive
AR forecasts.
8Note that we use a constant trend, i.e., average loan rate in the sample period, only for Belgium to
secure the estimation outcome.
9Note that the event of the ECB keeping the policy rate constant from 2003M07 to 2005M11 does
6￿nding is consistent with previous studies on loan rate stickiness in euro area countries.
Figures 2 and 3 show the estimation outcomes for the intermediate- and long-term
loans, respectively.10 We ￿nd that the loan rates are sticky for loans of these maturities.
An additional ￿nding is that average stickiness, which is given by an average of the posterior
means of the Calvo parameters across countries,11 for longer maturities tends to be larger
as shown in Figure 4.12 However, the loan rate stickiness for the intermediate- and long-
term loans is not so di⁄erent from that for short-term loans. We ￿nd a similar result in
each country. One reason for this is that loan rates are indexed to the market rate, as prime
rates and government bond rates, in the euro area. Thus, the loan rates for long maturities
are quickly adjusted against the length of maturity.13 Note that, in Austria, Greece, and
Italy, longer maturity loans have less loan rate stickiness than shorter maturity loans do.
This is because of the indexation of the loan rate and economic situation in each country.
In these three countries, longer maturity loans have lower loan rate levels than the shorter
maturity loans do.
4.2 Heterogeneity
In Table 2, to measure the heterogeneity in stickiness across countries, we calculate the
distribution of the di⁄erence in the Calvo parameters for all combinations of two countries
in January of each year. This distribution is computed using the MCMC outputs that we
draw in the estimation. The probability di⁄erence, pij = Pr(~  
(i)
t ￿ ~  
(j)
t > 0), measures
not distort our estimation results. This is because the loan rates still move enough in such the periods.
Moreover, equation (1) always holds even when it = 0, so we can measure loan rate stickiness.
10Note that for the intermediate-term loans, we reduce the sample period from 2003M1 to 2005M3 for
Ireland because there is a clear jump from 2005M3 to 2005M4 in the data, which makes estimation very
di¢ cult.
11Although we have many ways of identifying the posterior distributions, we follow the dynamics of the
Calvo parameter with respect to its posterior mean. As we report in the appendix, the shape of the posterior
distribution for the Calvo parameter is unimodal, so we can alternatively follow the modes or medians of
the posterior distribution although the insights regarding the results do not change.
12We exclude Ireland for intermediate-term loans in Figure 4.
13This point can also be con￿rmed by ￿gures showing dynamics of the loan rates in the euro area. These
￿gures are available by request.
7the degree of di⁄erence with respect to the estimated parameter distributions, where ~  
(k)
is the Calvo parameter for the k-th country. The table shows the number of sets of two
countries where the measure max(pij; 1￿pij) satis￿es the criteria of 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85,
90, and 95 percent. The two parameter distributions do not overlap for the 100 percent
criteria and are identical for the 50 percent criteria. We have 66 calculations overall from
12 countries for each loan maturity.14
Table 2 shows that there are heterogeneities for all loan maturities. For the short-term
loans, however, the degree of heterogeneity is not so strong through the sample periods.
The number of higher probability di⁄erences are not as large as for the short-term loans.
For the posterior means of the Calvo parameters, for example, France and Portugal show
more stickiness, but Germany and Ireland show less stickiness for the short-term loans, as in
Figure 1. The di⁄erence between the two groups is around 20% through the sample periods.
For the long-term loans, the heterogeneity is clearer. Table 2 shows that the number of
higher probability di⁄erences is large for the long-term loans. For the posterior means of
the Calvo parameters, for example, Germany and Netherlands show more stickiness, but
Greece and Italy show less stickiness for the long-term loans, as in Figure 3. The di⁄erence
between the two groups is around 30%. For the intermediate-term loans, the probability
di⁄erences of the parameter distributions are larger than those for the short-term loans in
the sense that the numbers in the 60 to 70 percent criteria are larger for the intermediate-
term loans regardless of the smaller samples. However, this does not hold for the over 70
percent criteria.
These results imply that the banking sector integration across euro area countries is
still far from perfect, in particular for longer maturity loans, which is consistent with
the outcomes of previous studies using di⁄erent econometric techniques (Mojon, 2000;
Słrensen and Werner, 2006; van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008). The ECB (2006) provides
some reasons for this heterogeneity, such as di⁄erences in the average period of initial
rate ￿xation, in collateral practices, and in market environments by ￿rm size among the
countries. The heterogeneous loan rate adjustment induces a monetary policy trade-o⁄ for
14For the intermediate-term loans, we exclude Ireland from the observation. Thus, we have 55 samples.
8the ECB because the best monetary policy for one country is not necessarily the best for
other countries.
4.3 Convergence
The last subsection shows that the heterogeneities in the loan rates do not disappear.
However, is there some evidence of perfect banking integration? Time-varying estimation
investigates this issue.
Table 2 shows that the probability di⁄erence in the parameter distributions disappears
for all maturity loans because the number of high probability di⁄erences decreases in recent
years.
To reveal how the heterogeneities disappear, Table 3 shows the inference on the average
di⁄erence in the posterior means of the Calvo parameters between the ￿rst half sample,
from 2003M03 to 2005M09, and the last half sample, from 2005M10 to 2008M04, for each
country.15 D denotes ￿decrease￿ , I denotes ￿increase￿ , and U denotes ￿unchanged￿in the
inferences.
For the short-term loans, loan rate stickiness decreases in almost all countries except
Italy and Portugal in the last few years as shown in the second column of Table 3. Even-
tually, the stickiness of the loan rates decreases even on average across the countries. We
con￿rm this point even in Figure 4, which reports the transition of the average of the
posterior means of the Calvo parameters across countries. Thus, the heterogeneities in
loan rate stickiness decrease because the loan rate stickiness decreases. This fact provides
evidence for the discussions in Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Gropp et al. (2006), and van
Leuvensteijn et al. (2008). They imply that more market competition lowers loan rate
stickiness. The euro area faces such a situation as ￿nancial market competition increases
because of less regulation on cross border ￿nancial business as pointed out by these papers.
For longer maturity loans, we cannot ￿nd trends that show reductions across countries
in loan rate stickiness as shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 3. The loan rate
stickiness for the intermediate- (long-) term loans increases in six (￿ve) countries, decreases
15For Ireland, we de￿ne the ￿rst half sample from 2005M04 to 2006M10 and the last half sample from
2006M11 to 2008M04.
9in three (￿ve) countries, and does not change in three (two) countries . As a result, average
loan rate stickiness across the countries does not change between the ￿rst and last half of
the sample for the long-term loans and slightly increases but negligibly for intermediate-
term loans as seen in Table 3. We con￿rm this point even in Figure 4. However, other
than reductions in loan rate stickiness, we see that the variance of the posterior means
of the Calvo parameters across countries decreases. The mean, standard deviation, and t
statistics for inference on the increase in the variance of the posterior means of the Calvo
parameters among countries for long-term loans and for intermediate-term loans are (￿
0.0004, 0.000098, ￿ 3.9) and (￿ 0.0016, 0.00064, ￿ 2.4), respectively.16 This implies that loan
rate stickiness converges to the average level of loan rate stickiness across the countries.
This is a di⁄erent type of evidence of convergence in the loan market, which eventually
induces reductions in heterogeneity in loan rate stickiness.
4.4 Dynamics
Our estimation technique can reveal the dynamic properties of loan rate stickiness with
respect to the economic situation in each country.
Figure 1 shows that the posterior means of loan rate stickiness do not change more
than 5% in all countries except Austria during the sample periods for the short-term
loans. Thus, loan rate stickiness does not change much according to the economic situation
in the country. However, Figures 2 and 3 show that the posterior means of loan rate
stickiness oscillate widely for the longer maturity loans. In almost all countries, loan
rate stickiness moves more than 5% during the sample period. For example, in Spain
(Finland), the posterior mean of loan rate stickiness changes 10% (13%) and 15% (13%)
for the intermediate- and long-term loans, respectively, compared with 3% (4%) for the
short-term loans. This implies that loan rate stickiness changes according to economic
conditions for the longer maturities. These ￿ndings are consistent with yield curves. It
is well known that longer maturity loan rates change their dynamics more dramatically
16For the short-term loans, the variance of the posterior means of the Calvo parameters among the
countries does not change. The mean, standard deviation, and t statistics for inference on the increase of
the variance for short-term loans are (0.000009, 0.000024, 0.39).
10than shorter maturity loan rate do because of a term premium depending on the market
expectation that is very vulnerable to economic conditions.
It has sometimes been argued that there might be asymmetric adjustment speeds in
the loan rates depending on whether the adjustments are towards higher or lower rates.
In particular, the private banks are likely to quickly increase loan rates when the ECB
increases the policy rate because the private banks want to add increased funding costs
on the loan rates to secure their pro￿ts. We check this point. During the ￿rst half of
the sample, the ECB decreased or ￿xed the policy rate but the ECB increased the policy
rate during the last half of the sample. Thus, Table 2 provides insights to asymmetric
adjustment. For the short-term loans, we can see asymmetric adjustment because loan
rate stickiness decreases in many countries following an increase in the loan rates. This
asymmetric adjustment could be the reason for the reductions in loan rate stickiness. For
intermediate- and long-term loans, however, we see reductions in loan rate stickiness in
some countries, but we cannot say that loan rate stickiness decreases in many countries in
Table 2.
5 Robustness
In this section, we show that the ￿ndings in the last section are robust for di⁄erent model
speci￿cations. In particular, we consider the case of Germany as a robustness check.17
5.1 Forward variable based on out-of-sample forecasts
As a robustness check for our estimation result, we estimate the TVR-SV model using
the out-of-sample forecasts for the forward variable, Rt+1. To generate the out-of-sample
forecasts, we ￿t an autoregressive model to the historical data up to time t, while the
in-sample forecasts are made by ￿tting one to the entire sample. Because the original data
starts from January 2003, we ￿rstly use the data from January 2003 to February 2004 to
forecast the forward variable to March 2004 by ￿tting an AR(2) model. We recursively
update the historical data (from January 2003 to month t) to ￿t the AR(2) model and the
17The outcomes for other countries and analyses on these outcomes are available by request.
11corresponding OLS estimator is used for forecasts. We label this method as a recursive
AR(2).
Figure 5 draws the transition of the Calvo parameters with out-of-sample forecasts of
the recursive AR(2) for Germany. The case of ￿tting a recursive AR(3) model and the
original model as the original AR(2) from the Figure 1, 2, and 3 are also reported. For
the case of the short- and intermediate-term loans, the transitions of the Calvo parame-
ters under recursive AR forecasts are slightly upward; however, the estimation results are
basically the same as the original AR(2). For the long-term loans, the di⁄erence from the
original estimates is wider than the ones for the other loans. However, the recursive model
captures well the sudden change around 2006￿ 2007 as the original AR(2). Therefore, our
estimation is robust with respect to the computation of the forward variable.
5.2 Ratio of external ￿nance
In this subsection, we relax the assumption that the ￿rm ￿nances all production costs by
loans. When the ￿rm ￿nances only some parts of production costs by loans, the parameter




1+’2￿ . ￿ is a ratio of external ￿nance.18 When ￿ increases,
the e⁄ect of the policy rate on the loan rate, i.e., ￿3, increases. ￿ is a parameter re￿ ecting
the degree of monopolistic power of private banks to ￿rms in setting loan rates.19 When
￿ increases, monopolistic power decreases and so the steady state markup from the policy
rate to the loan rate, i.e., 1+r
1+i, decreases, where r and i are steady state values of the loan
rate and policy rate, respectively. Thanks to the degree of monopolistic power and the
ratio of external ￿nance, the model can include more detailed properties of the ￿nancial
market of each country.
To secure estimation robustness, we choose the case of ￿ =0.5 and 0.75. There, we
calculate " as it satis￿es 1+r
1+i =1.024, 1.018, and 1.024, which are the average values for
the short-, intermediate-, and long-term loans, respectively, in the sample periods for Ger-
18In the basic setting, ￿ = 1. See the details of the derivation in Teranishi (2008).
19In the theoretical model, private banks can set di⁄erent loan rates to ￿rms according to business
characteristics di⁄erentiated by labor types de￿ned by ￿, which eventually de￿nes the degree of monopolistic
power.
12many.20 Then, for the short-, intermediate-, and long-term loans, we have " =83.9 when
￿ =0.5 and " =56.4 when ￿ =0.75, " =111.5 when ￿ =0.5 and " =74.2 when ￿ =0.75, and
" =83.9 when ￿ =0.5 and " =56.4 when ￿ =0.75, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the estimation results with di⁄erent ratios of external ￿nance. We
con￿rm that our results in previous sections are robust even for this speci￿cation.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper shed light on loan rate stickiness and its heterogeneity in the euro area. A
time-varying regression with stochastic volatility is applied to structural loan rate curves
for 12 euro area countries. The estimation results showed that loan rates are sticky and
the stickiness di⁄ers across the countries. This result is robust for three types of loan
duration. We conclude that the banking sector integration across euro area countries is
imperfect in terms of loan rate stickiness. However, the degree of heterogeneity in the loan
rate stickiness decreases during the last few years.






￿(1￿￿)+"￿ in the steady state to calculate " as derived in Teranishi
(2008).
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16Table 1: Summary statistics for loan data. Standard deviation and range across countries
for each year (monthly average).
Year Short-term loan Intermediate-term loan Long-term loan
Standard deviation
2003 0.667 0.707 0.621
2004 0.627 0.726 0.648
2005 0.530 0.711 0.598
2006 0.550 0.692 0.510
2007 0.632 0.602 0.527
Range (max. ￿ min.)
2003 2.178 2.404 1.714
2004 1.981 2.575 1.909
2005 2.000 2.472 1.773
2006 1.966 2.335 1.618
2007 2.373 2.065 1.630
17Table 2: Di⁄erence in distributional probability.
Short-term loan >60 >65 >70 >75 >80 >85 >90 >95
2004 33 25 20 17 9 4 0 0
2005 34 24 20 17 12 8 2 0
2006 38 29 24 20 15 12 4 0
2007 39 34 26 20 18 13 4 0
2008 38 32 24 19 14 4 0 0
Intermediate-term loan >60 >65 >70 >75 >80 >85 >90 >95
2004 40 32 20 12 8 5 1 0
2005 40 38 27 17 9 7 2 0
2006 39 30 20 12 8 4 0 0
2007 41 31 21 16 13 6 2 1
2008 34 21 10 7 3 1 0 0
Long-term loan >60 >65 >70 >75 >80 >85 >90 >95
2004 54 48 34 29 24 15 9 4
2005 59 50 44 39 31 23 16 10
2006 54 51 45 36 29 25 16 7
2007 52 47 44 39 36 35 24 9
2008 50 40 32 26 20 10 3 0
18Table 3: Posterior mean di⁄erences for loans between ￿rst and last half samples.
Country Short-term loan Intermediate-term loan Long-term loan
Austria D (-0.08, -15.6) D (-0.06, -10.6) D (-0.03, -5.7)
Belgium D (-0.02, -13.4) I (0.01, 3.2) D (-0.03, -3.9)
Netherlands D (-0.02, -7.9) I (0.02, 2.9) D (-0.04, -5.3)
Finland D (-0.03, -20.0) I (0.04, 4.5) I (0.04, 4.6)
France D (-0.004, -2.7) I (0.02, 10.0) I (0.02, 14.7)
Germany D (-0.01, -14.1) I (0.02, 8.9) U (-0.01, -0.6)
Greece D (-0.02, -10.0) D (-0.01, -4.2) I (0.01, 3.7)
Ireland D (-0.01, -4.3) D (-0.04, -13.3) D (-0.02, -13.9)
Italy I (0.01, 1.9) U (0.001, 0.2) I (0.06, 10.2)
Luxemburg D (-0.03, -19.8) U (-0.005, -1.4) U (0.001, 0.4)
Portugal I (0.01, 10.0) U (-0.008, -0.9) D (-0.03, -5.2)
Spain D (-0.01, -8.2) I (0.04, 6.9) I (0.08, 10.7)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Calvo parameters for the short-term loans. Posterior means (solid)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Calvo parameters for the intermediate-term loans. Posterior means




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean of Calvo parameters (short term loan)
Mean of Calvo parameters (intermediate term loan)
Mean of Calvo parameters (long term loan)
Figure 4: Transition of average of the posterior means of Calvo
parameters across countries.
23(i) Short term loan
(ii) Intermediate term loan



























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Posterior means and one-standard-deviation bands for Calvo parameters
under di⁄erence expectation formations (Germany).
24(i) Short term loan
(ii) Intermediate term loan



















































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Posterior means and one-standard-deviation bands for Calvo parameters
under di⁄erent conditions of external ￿nance (Germany). External (1) and (2) refer to
the ratio of the external ￿nance 0.5 and 0.75 respectively.
25Appendix: MCMC algorithm for the TVR-SV model
Let y = (y1;:::;yn), h = (h1;:::;hn), ￿ = (~ ￿1;:::; ~ ￿n) and ￿ = (￿u;￿￿). Under the
prior ￿(￿), we obtain the posterior distribution as:
￿(￿;h;￿jy) / ￿(￿) ￿ f(yj￿;h) ￿ ￿(￿j￿u) ￿ ￿(hj￿￿);
where f is the conditional likelihood function of the observation equation. We draw samples
from this posterior distribution by the MCMC method. There are several ways of sampling,
while we propose the following algorithm, which is relatively simple:
1. Initialize ￿, ￿, h.
2. Sample (￿;￿u)jy;h by
(a) sampling ￿jy;￿u;h,
(b) sampling ￿uj￿.
3. Sample (h;￿￿)jy;￿ by
(a) sampling hjy;￿￿;￿,
(b) sampling ￿￿jh.
4. Go to 2.
In step 2(a), we can sample ￿ using the Gaussian simulation smoother (de Jong and
Shephard, 1995). In step 3(a), we implement the sampling with the help of a multi-move
sampler for nonlinear Gaussian state space models (Shephard and Pitt, 1996, and Watanabe
and Omori, 2004), which produces an e¢ cient draw of the state variable (h in our case)
relative to a single-move sampler. Steps 2(b) and 3(b) require only a draw from a gamma
or Wishart distribution under a conjugate prior.
We check the convergence of the estimation result for the TVR-SV model. Figure 7
illustrates the MCMC sampling result; sample autocorrelations, sample paths and posterior
densities of the parameters, ￿u, ￿￿, ~ ￿30 and h30, which are obtained from the estimation
26using the Germany data for loans up to one year. The sample autocorrelations drop
smoothly and the sample paths look stable, which indicates our sampling method e¢ ciently
produces uncorrelated samples. Table 4 reports the convergence diagnostics of Geweke
(1992), which computes the CD statistics de￿ned by:
CD =
￿ x0 ￿ ￿ x1 q
^ ￿2
0=n0 + ^ ￿2
1=n1
;






j=nj is the standard error of ￿ xj respectively for j = 0;1,
and x(i) is the i-th draw. If the sequence of the MCMC sampling is stationary, it converges
in distribution to a standard normal. We set m0 = 1, n0 = 1;000, m1 = 5;001 and
n1 = 5;000. The ^ ￿2
j is computed using a Parzen window with bandwidth of 100. From
the estimation result of the CD, the null hypothesis of the convergence to the posterior
distribution is accepted for all parameters at the 5% signi￿cance level. From these results,
we conclude that the MCMC sampling converges in our proposed method.
Table 4: CD statistics for the estimation result of MCMC sampling (Germany, Short-term
loans).
Parameter: ￿u ￿￿ ~ ￿30 h30
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Figure 7: Estimation result of MCMC sampling (Germany, short-term loan). Sample
autocorrelations (top), sample paths (middle) and posterior densities (bottom).
We state one of the advantages to use a Bayesian inference and the MCMC method as
follows. The structural model of the loan rate curve forms a nonlinear equation with respect
to the Calvo parameter. To obtain the posterior distribution of the Calvo parameter, we
sample the parameters and only need to compute the Calvo parameter from the draw of
~ ￿t for every iteration of MCMC sampling. Figure 8 draws the posterior densities of the
Calvo parameter on June of each year for Austria for short-term loans.
We analyze the dynamics of the Calvo parameter by plotting the time series of poste-
rior means in this paper. Figure 9 draws the posterior mean, median and one-standard-
deviation band of the Calvo parameter for Austria for short-term loans. Although the
density of the Calvo parameter is slightly asymmetric as shown in Figure 8, the posterior
28mean and median are moving together over time.















Figure 8: Posterior densities of the Calvo parameter in June in






















































Figure 9: Posterior mean, median and one-standard-deviation bands
for the Calvo parameter (Austria, short- term loans).
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